What really went wrong with Greek public finances? This paper evaluates the evidence from the decade preceding the outbreak of the fiscal crisis in Greece shedding some light on specific factors behind deviations from fiscal plans. It explains that Greece only partly fits international evidence on the economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal forecast errors. The weak domestic institutional budget framework emerges as the main reason for weak fiscal performance, while inconsistencies in the forecasts of international organisations place the effectiveness of their monitoring under question. In this light, the paper puts forward some ideas for improving the domestic institutional framework for conducting fiscal policy in Greece and briefly evaluates some relevant recent government initiatives.
"It is not enough to recommend good fiscal policy to a country -or for the ImF to make loans to a country conditional on good fiscal policy -if … institutions are not there to sustain the policy" Frankel, 2011 I. InTRodUcTIon
The recent global financial crisis has put european governments and the european Union fiscal framework at strain. Fiscal deficits, once small and controlled in most eU countries, have soared after the outbreak of the recent global financial crisis, as a result of both the direct fiscal costs of bank and other enterprise rescue operations and of government policies aimed at sustaining domestic demand within an environment of rapidly weakening economic activity. In a number of countries, including Greece, the deterioration of the fiscal outlook has been so severe, that the financial markets' reaction to the perceived threat in fiscal sustainability, brought the cost of financing for these countries to prohibitive levels. one can blame the governments for their failure to consolidate budgets in the period of good times before the crisis. The eU rules-based fiscal framework can be also blamed for such failures, since following its success in inducing member states' commitment to sound fiscal policies during their run-up to the emU, it apparently lost momentum right afterwards. 2 since credible fiscal plans aimed at restoring fiscal sustainability become increasingly essential, attention at an academic and policy level is growingly shifting towards the economic, political and institutional factors that underpin such credibility. In this light, the literature is growing on the importance of fiscal governance for budgetary outcomes. Fiscal governance includes arrangements such as legally binding fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks, budgetary procedures and the establishment of independent fiscal authorities (e.g. european commission 2009, Ayuso-i-casals 2010). Furthermore, the strengthening of fiscal governance at a national level and its role in budgetary outcomes has recently received particular attention in view of the difficulties to effectively enforce the fiscal rules set at the european level by the stability and Growth Pact (e.g. von Hagen et al. 2009 , ImF 2009 , von Hagen 2010 , european commission 2010a .
At the same time, many recent papers explore the sources of deviations of ex-post budget outcomes from first-release outcomes (i.e. revision errors) and from budget plans (i.e. implementation errors). The sources identified vary from the quality of fiscal institutions, to political distortions and the credibility of the macroeconomic scenario underpinning fiscal projections. The policy conclusions drawn usually point to the direction of adopting independent macroeconomic forecasts, improving the quality of institutions, setting minimum standards for national fiscal frameworks and improving national ownership (e.g. Jonung and larch 2006 , Beetsma et al. 2009 .
The present paper focuses on the Greek case and contrasts it with the international experience for two main reasons. The first most obvious one is that Greece is indeed an outlier in the 2 It is worth noting that presently the criticism has also been raised that in the period of crisis fiscal consolidation programs that are heavily frontloaded fail to materialize because their effect on growth was underestimated. As Blanchard and leigh (2013) note the fiscal multipliers in periods of crisis can be much larger than in normal times.
size and repercussions of its fiscal derailment. This in its own right deserves taking a closer look. What we specifically argue is that a most fundamental reason for Greece's poor fiscal performance has been its weak fiscal governance, as well as the ineffectiveness of international organizations to play a signaling role. despite the fact that there are several studies evaluating aspects of fiscal governance in Greece (european commission 2007 , ImF 2006 , Rapanos 2007 , oecd 2008 , Vraniali 2010 , such analyses are somewhat disjoint from actual budget outcomes, leaving a gap in our understanding of the Greek problem. At the same time, the role of weak fiscal governance in generating the fiscal crisis is overlooked, the only exception being katsimi and moutos (2010) and moutos and Tsitsikas (2010) who nevertheless adopt a broader political-economy perspective.
The second reason is that Greece deserves closer scrutiny since it only partly fits international evidence on the sources of "deviations from fiscal plans", something that so far escapes the attention of those analyzing the Greek case. In several studies examining the reliability of fiscal forecasts and the determinants of budget forecast errors, Greece is bunched together in panel regressions with other eU or oecd countries. As mentioned before, such studies indentify a link between a reliable macroeconomic scenario and reliable fiscal forecasts, and also highlight the importance of certain political factors and fiscal institutions. We explore the extent to which these findings apply to Greece.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. section II documents the poor mechanism for setting up and monitoring the implementation of the budget in Greece and the deviations of budgetary outcomes from the targets set at a central and general government level throughout the decade preceding the outbreak of the fiscal crisis in 2009. In section III, the Greek evidence on the usual suspects behind missing fiscal targets is contrasted with international evidence, revealing some commonalities and some differences, but also raising some questions regarding the effectiveness of international organizations in their forecasts concerning Greece. In section IV we make some proposals for improving the institutional and legal framework for conducting fiscal policy. However, we refrain from exhaustively evaluating the relevant measures taken under the suggestions of the three international organizations survelleing the Greek economy since 2010 for two reasons. Firstly, the policy priorities so far seem to be on directly containing deficit figures rather than on qualitative institutional reforms. secondly, many of the suggested institutional reforms are in the process of implementation and hence cannot be evaluated yet. In the last section we summarize the main findings of our analysis and draw some policy conclusions.
II. GReek BUdGeT PRocess And BUdGeTARy oUTcomes
It is true that Greece has been living with a high public debt for a long period of time. In the 1990s, in its effort to join the emU, the government made a major effort to reduce fiscal deficits and control the rise of public debt, and succeeded in fulfilling the criteria for becoming member of the euro area. Unfortunately, this effort was not continued in the following years, and with the recent economic crisis, Greece found itself in the brink of a financial collapse. despite the fact that the Greek economy attained high growth rates throughout the last decade, fiscal imbalances were never effectively brought under control. one can find many explanations for high deficits. The most fundamental reason, however, has been the weak institutional framework of budgeting and tax administration. A basic weakness of the Greek fiscal system is the poor mechanism of setting up the budget, and the lack of any systematic monitoring of its implementation. While the Parliament has a powerful constitutional role in voting the state (central government) budget, not only as a whole but also by ministry, it does not have any kind of mechanism to follow up on the budget execution, and to monitor developments on public expenditures and revenues. 3 Had deviations from the targets not been large, the problem would perhaps not have been important. However, apparently that was not the case. How had major fiscal components of the state budget evolved one year after the approval by the Parliament of the respective targets? As Figure 1 shows, not particularly well, with deviations varying from year to year 4 . smaller deviations and even positive surprises coincide with the periods of fiscal consolidation episodes imposed by the european fiscal framework. on the whole, however, total revenues and primary expenditure were not evolving according to plan. In most years, there were significant shortfalls in revenues and serious expenditure overruns. note: Targets refer to data presented to Parliament in november of year t concerning the data of year t+1. Withinyear estimates refer to data presented to Parliament in november of year t+1 concerning the data of year t+1. source: Authors' calculations based on ministry of economy and Finance, Introductory Report of the state Budget, Athens (various issues).
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For details see kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2011a) . 4 despite the fact that deviations from targets were usually rather high almost all years, they appear condensed once the exceptionally high revenue shortfalls of 2009 are added. Therefore, we present data for 2009 separately on the right diagram.
more notably, the Parliament apparently could not impose any corrective action in the cases where the targets for revenue and expenditure were evidently going to be missed. The final outcome instead exhibited a further deterioration. Figure 2 presents the deviations of within-year estimates of the same fiscal aggregates from the final outcomes. deviations from both the revenue and the expenditure targets expand further. A v e r a g e 1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 9
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Figure 3 presents the size of the average percentage deviations of final outcomes from the targets set in the budget over the 2001-2009 period. The within-year estimates presented to the Parliament indicated that revenues were falling short of the budgeted amount by 3.8%, while primary expenditure was going to exceed the targeted amount by 2.4% and interest payments by 1%. The final outcome drew an even bleaker picture, with revenue shortfalls reaching over 6% and expenditure overruns having further increased. The deviations of revenues and expenditures in percentage terms might not strike too large, but when fed into the state Budget deficit, they imply that the final figure for the state budget deficit stood every year on average 67% higher than the budgeted amount.
An inherent problem of the Greek budgeting system stems from the fact that while Parliament approves the state budget it has little if any say on the general government budget. The stability and Growth Pact, however, requires fiscal aggregates to be reported at a general government level. state budget data have, therefore, to be adjusted to a national accounts basis and be aggregated with data covering local authorities, social security funds and hospitals. The approval of fiscal forecasts included in the stability and Growth Programs submitted to the european commission is simply a responsibility of the ministry of Finance, therefore the Parliament is rarely presented with such data, let alone asked to monitor them. The even greater lack of monitoring at a national level of the targets set for the general government balance and its components goes, not surprisingly, hand in hand with even higher deviations. Table 1 compares the targets set at various updates of the Hellenic stability and Growth Program for the revenues, primary expenditure and interest payments at a general government level. When we move from the state to the general government level, deviations appear slightly lower in absolute amounts in the case of revenue shortfalls, but almost three times higher in the case of primary expenditure overruns. The relative improvement in the performance of revenue once we move to the general government level is primarily attributed to the considerable surpluses recorded every year by social security funds, an issue that has attracted the attention of eurostat more than once. 5 Table 1 exclude the effect of such ex post revisions of general government revenue and expenditure data. deviations from targets now appear much smaller in the case of government expenditure, which is to be expected since most revisions referred to the methodology in recording expenditure items (e.g. military expenditure).
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Regarding the size and revisions of the surpluses of social security funds and the explanations provided by the Greek authorities, the european commission notes in its latest report on Greek statistics that "it does not find these explanations sufficient and will carry out in the coming months a thorough investigation of the process of calculation by the Greek authorities of the surplus/deficit of the social security sector" (european commission 2010b).
III. UsUAl sUsPecTs BeHInd mIssInG FIscAl TARGeTs:
GReece VeRsUs InTeRnATIonAl eVIdence one fact can be established with hardly any doubt: on the whole fiscal targets in Greece were systematically being missed by a wide margin. A natural question arises: is there something intrinsically flawed in the way fiscal targets were set either at the state or at the general government level? A recent, but fastly growing literature aims precisely at identifying the sources of deviations from fiscal plans. A detailed review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper, yet the statistical properties of fiscal forecast errors are broadly explained in terms of economic, political and institutional factors. 6 These will be examined in turn.
The most frequently identified economic determinant of fiscal forecast errors is the strategic use by governments of optimistic economic growth assumptions, (e.g. Jonung and larch 2006 , Von Hagen et al. 2009 , Pina and Venes 2011 , Frankel 2011 . The theoretical argument behind adopting optimistic projections for GdP growth at least for countries operating within the eU fiscal framework is clear. Weaker than expected growth serves as a good argument for fiscal outcomes turning out worse than planned. 7 The argument that politically motivated systematic optimism concerning economic growth played a potentially significant role in generating fiscal deficits has also been put forward for Greece (ImF 2006 , Vraniali 2010 ). An additional explanation for the adoption of optimistic projections for GdP growth could be an attempt of the government to affect private sector expectations, as has been put forward in a more general context (musso and Phillips 2002). The link, however, is not straightforward, since the markets' expectations seem to also take into account the credibility of forecasting institutions (Poplawski-Ribeiro and Rülke 2011). This is another interesting avenue of research which will not be pursued further in the present paper. Taking a closer look at the Greek case, Table 2 contrasts GdP and fiscal forecast errors made by the Greek government and also by three international organizations over the 2000-2009 period. In constructing our dataset on one-year-ahead forecasts for GdP and the general government balance we have used four sources: (1) the stability and Growth Programs submitted by the Greek governments to the commission every december; (2) the biannual forecasts (spring and autumn) of the european commission; (3) the biannual forecasts (spring and autumn) published by the oecd in the economic outlook and (4) the biannual forecasts (spring and autumn) published by the ImF in its World economic outlook. The final outcomes for GdP growth and the fiscal balance are taken from the statistical appendix of ec (2011), while first-release data for the same variables are extracted from the spring excessive deficit Procedure notifications.
Referring to the period 2000-2009, the first column of Table 2 shows the average deviation of the forecast for the real growth rate adopted by the stability and Growth Programs for the following year from the final outcome. It appears that Greek governments did tend to overestimate real GdP growth, yet by a rather small margin of 0.41 percentage point. The three international organizations (i.e. the european commission, the oecd and the ImF), all adopted rather conservative within-year forecasts for GdP growth, marginally underestimating the Greek GdP growth rate. The magnitude of the underestimation halves in the autumn forecast as the calendar year approaches its end.
Forecasts for the general government balance convey an entirely different picture (column 2 of Table 2 ). The targets set in the stability and Growth Programs were highly unrealistic and therefore unreliable, since they were missed by a large margin (on average the annual deficit was 5.3% of GdP higher than the target). more surprisingly, the prudency of the international organizations' GdP forecasts does not translate into analogous prudency when it comes to public deficit. The ec forecasts appear to highly underestimate public deficits, even in the autumn forecasts, just one month before the end of the year in question. even if we take into account the multiple ex-post revisions of Greek fiscal deficits, 8 which presumably could not be accounted for either by the Greek governments or by the international organizations, the 7 For a good exposition of the argument see Von Hagen (2010) . note also that the commission takes into account the cyclical stance of the economy as a factor not controlled by the government. 8 Revisions are defined as the differences between the final outcome of each year and the figure appearing as the first provisional estimate (in the edP notification of march of the following year).
performance of forecasts certainly improves, but still falls short of what could be expected (see third column of Table 2 ). 
General government balance (% of GDP) The spring forecasts underestimated fiscal deficit on average by almost 2pp of GdP, while the autumn forecast still underestimated deficits by more than 0.5% of GdP. The ImF forecasts appear as the most unreliable (partly owing to the fact that they are conducted slightly earlier than those of the other two international organizations). 9 such deviations from fiscal plans and forecast errors by international organizations are unusual among developed countries. Beetsma et al. (2009) , for example, using data from the national stability and Growth Programmes, report an average one-year-ahead budget balance implementation error of just -0.15% of GdP for the eU-14 (luxembourg excluded) for the period 1999-2007. evaluating oecd forecasts for a similar time span (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) for 19 oecd countries, cimadomo (2011) reports a mean absolute error for the one-year-ahead forecast of the cyclically adjusted primary balance of 1.4% of GdP. The error for Greece is the highest and stands at an average of almost 3% of GdP. Pisany-Ferry et al. (2011) compare forecast 9 marinheiro (2011) also provides evidence that the european commission's forecast errors for Greek GdP growth and for the budget balance are of opposite sign, unlike what is the case for the other eU countries.
errors of the european commission and the ImF for the 2005-2010 period. The commission's forecasting error bias for the government balance, measured by the root mean square error, is 2.12 for the euro area (compared to 6.66 for Greece). The respective figure by the ImF is 2.28 for the euro area (compared to 4.85 for Greece).
At this point it would be interesting to draw a link between the above literature and the very recent criticism on growth forecast errors of international organizations (Blanchard and leigh, 2013) . With many countries having embarked on fiscal adjustment programs in response to elevated government debt levels, it has been argued that the negative effect of such consolidation on economic growth has been underestimated by these organizations. This would suggest that the size of short-term fiscal multipliers used by forecasters was quite smaller than it should. In this context, the Blanchard and leigh (2013) paper investigates whether there is a negative relation between fiscal consolidation forecasts and subsequent growth forecast errors, suggesting therefore that growth disappointments should be larger in economies that planned greater fiscal cutbacks. This is indeed what they find for the period after the financial crisis (2009 onwards).
The results are not verified, however, for the 1997-2008 period, when the size of fiscal multipliers used appears to be approximately correct. The mistake of forecasters seems therefore to be that they did not quickly realize that fiscal multipliers are not of the same size in normal times and in recessions, and that a number of additional factors during the crisis such as the liquidity trap or a poorly functioning financial system led to larger multipliers. It can be easily understood that the literature we have surveyed examines the effects of growth forecasts on fiscal deficit forecasts and whether there was a strategic use of optimistic growth forecasts on the part of governments in order to avoid fiscal consolidation. Blanchard and leigh (2013) , on the other hand, study the effect of fiscal consolidation on growth forecasts. It might be worth noting that Blanchard and leigh (2013) do not examine the potential effect that growth forecast errors could have on the implementation of fiscal consolidation plans.
Returning to the questions raised by the former papers and in order to place their results on a more systematic footing, we adopt Frankel's (2011) simple analytical framework, by regressing the budget balance one-year-ahead forecast error against the real GdP growth one-year-ahead forecast error to test for possible links. Frankel's analysis regards 33 oecd countries and concludes that the growth rate forecast error is highly significant at determining the budget balance forecast error. In fact, it appears that for every percentage point of deviation in the growth forecast, the actual budget balance deviates by about half that amount from the level officially planned. An effect of a similar order of magnitude is corroborated by Beetsma et al. (2011) and marinheiro (2011) . Table 3 reports Frankel's estimates along with our own estimates just for Greece, during the decade preceding the outbreak of the fiscal crisis. Results of the regression analysis are presented for four sets of forecast errors (the Greek government's, the european commission's, the oecd's and the ImF's). The lower part of the table excludes the impact of ex-post revisions of statistical data by considering deviations of forecasts from first-release estimates. In contrast with international evidence, the Greek data indicate no significant impact of the GdP forecast error on the budget forecast error, since the former is not significant in any of the regressions even at the 10% significance level. A sample of scatterplot diagrams of the budget deviations and the GdP forecast errors also implies the absence of any relationship (see Figure 4) . In fact, in the majority of cases the forecast errors are of opposite signs. A caveat of this analysis is that it is based on data covering just a decade (since comparable data for a longer time period are not available). In this sense it would be far-reaching to conclude that economic factors do not matter. yet, it appears that despite the fact that the economy did appear to grow in line with what the government (and other international organizations) had assumed, budgeted revenues did not find their way into the public purse, while expenditures (especially primary expenditures) were not kept under planned control. This feature was systematically not being picked up either by the Greek government or by the commission or by the other two international organizations that were monitoring the Greek economy. The sources of the inefficiency of official government projections are studied in the present paper, yet the questions raised for the international organizations are left largely open. 
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As suggested in the beginning of this section, there are two other sets of factors that are found to determine the statistical properties of budget balance forecast errors. one set of factors refers to potential political distortions. A major type of such distortion concerns "size fragmentation", where coalition governments are expected to be more prone to common pool problems in comparison to e.g. single party governments. Another major type of political distortion is the result of 'time fragmentation', whereby more frequent changes in government shorten the expected tenure of governments and effectively raise the rate at which the latter discount the future. Thus, more 'time fragmentation' governments may perceive more leeway to be too optimistic (Beetsma et al. 2011) . The political color of the government, as well as the ideological gap between successive governments are two more factors with a potentially significant effect on forecasting errors. The list of political variables might be long, but the above four variables are representative, quantifiable and have been used in other studies (Beetsma et al. 2011, Pina and Venes 2011) . Table 4 presents the value of each of the aforementioned political indices for Greece, as well as Greece's rank in the respective country sample. In this particular aspect, Greece's performance appears rather outstanding. It has very strong governments (all single-party majorities), among the lowest number of government changes, and even when the government does change, its ideological gap with its predecessor is exceedingly low. The political color of the government (hegemony of social-democratic cabinet) is the only possibly adverse factor.
This leaves the third set of usual suspects behind missing fiscal targets, namely the quality of fiscal institutions and fiscal governance, as the main candidate for the Greek case. As already mentioned, institutions have been receiving increasing emphasis in explaining deviations from fiscal plans and so has the measurement of their quality. Practically all empirical papers on the determinants of forecast errors provide evidence that strong fiscal rules (establishing for example expenditure ceilings) and institutions (such as medium-term budgetary frameworks) are associated with relatively accurate releases of fiscal data and small projection errors by governments and national institutions (Jonung and larch 2006 , Beetsma et al. 2009 , Von Hagen 2010 , Beetsma et al. 2011 , Pina and Venes 2011 . 10 All the above studies include Greece in their country sample.
The role of institutions is captured by a variety of indices and Table 4 presents some of the most frequently used, that is (a) the 'fiscal rules index' compiled by the european commission which measures the presence, strength and coverage of all numerical fiscal rules in force; (b) the national medium-term budgetary framework index compiled by the european commission, which captures the procedures for the preparation, execution and monitoring of multi-annual budget plans; (c) an 'audit' index compiled by Bernoth and Wolff (2008) , which measures the extent to which governments are externally audited for their finances, the degree of independence of the auditing and the dissemination of the obtained information; and (d) an index measuring legislative capacity to ensure transparency in the budget process, compiled very recently by the oecd. Table 4 documents the almost complete lack of effective fiscal institutions in Greece, since the country ranks last in every single aspect under consideration. Apart from the rules set with regard to deficit limits within the eU fiscal framework, which itself was previously shown not 10 For an excellent survey of the literature, see cimadomo (2011). to have worked particularly well, Greek fiscal governance is characterized by absence of fiscal benchmarks, weak medium term planning, lack of transparency in government finances and limited capacity of the legislative arm to brainstorm over the government budget proposal. This finding is not new. The european commission's database on fiscal governance 11 (comprising of a range of variables on national numerical fiscal rules, independent fiscal institutions and medium-term budgetary frameworks) documents fully the differences between Greece and other eU members with respect to key elements of domestic fiscal frameworks. According to this database, Greece ranks low on any fiscal governance indicator. kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2011b) also elaborate more on the comparison of fiscal institutions between Greece and other developed countries. 12 The major conclusions one can draw from this short analysis are rather clear, despite the fact that the limited time span for which comparable data are available for Greece prevents a fully-fledged econometric analysis. Budget balance targets in Greece were being missed by a wide margin throughout the decade preceding the outbreak of the fiscal crisis in 2009. The strategic government use of optimistic growth forecasts has to be excluded in the Greek case, since GdP forecast errors are at odds with public deficit forecast errors, contrary to what is documented for other eU or oecd countries. Political factors, at least as captured by relevant indices, in theory should be conducive to fiscal prudence. This leaves poor fiscal institutions as the main determinant of non-credible fiscal plans. Therefore, any attempt to correct fiscal imbalances is rather doomed to fail unless the reform of the fiscal framework is also given serious thought. The following section puts forward some ideas on possible ways of improving this institutional framework.
IV. ImPRoVInG THe domesTIc FIscAl FRAmeWoRk In GReece:
some PRoPosAls A detailed analysis of the ways in which the institutional framework for setting, executing and evaluating the budget should be reformed is perhaps beyond the scope of the present paper. 13 We will, however, attempt to lay out some key dimensions of such reform in the areas of budgetary procedures, tax administration and also regarding the possible role of an independent fiscal council.
Budgeting Procedures
The issue of poor budget management in Greece is neither neglected nor newly discovered. There is indeed a long series of studies identifying its key aspects and proposing ways for reform, see for example Hm Treasury ( Furthermore, it seems that the public is rather conscious of the necessity and merits of fiscal consolidation (see last two lines of Table 4 ), so that government's reliance on deficit spending is not likely to be explained in terms of voters' preferences.
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For a recent review of several aspects of public financial management and budgeting, see shah (2007) and, more specifically on Greece, see Rapanos (2007) , Vraniali (2010) and oecd (2010) .
main weaknesses of the budgeting framework in Greece includes lack of transparency and of a medium-term budgetary framework, rigid budget structure 14 , absence of program budgeting, a weak top-down budgeting process, lack of real accountability and organizational weaknesses. The directions of desired reform are rather self-evident, if the above weakness of the Greek budgetary framework are set against the main features of a system of sound budgetary procedures identified by, for example, the european commission (2009) and briefly outlined in kaplanoglou and Rapanos (2011a) . The list of budgeting reform recommendations is indeed long and has been analyzed in detail by other authors (e.g. oecd, 2010, Rapanos, 2007 , Vraniali, 2010 , but its main elements can be summarized as follows:
• consolidate budgeting procedures by merging the ordinary and the public investment budgets.
• Introduce a new accounting system compatible with the International Public Accounting standards for all bodies of the general government.
• Improve the timeliness and reliability of budget execution reports, which should be produced on a monthly basis.
• Introduce a new effective internal auditing system, but also use external auditors.
• Introduce stronger top-down budgeting in order to improve ownership of line ministries, along the lines proposed by oecd (2010).
• Introduce program budgeting and focus attention on the quality of public expenditures.
• Introduce national fiscal rules, incorporated in law, which should be open, transparent and comprehensive of all fiscal activity of the public sector.
• Introduce a medium term fiscal framework, incorporating multiyear estimates.
• consider the introduction of "accruals accounting".
In recent years, there have been some attempts to address some of the weaknesses listed above. Perhaps the most wide-ranging attempt to reform public financial management in Greece has been law 3871/2010 on "Fiscal management and Responsibility", which was voted in August 2010. A detailed description and evaluation of the new provisions are perhaps beyond the scope of the present paper, but it is worth mentioning a few points of key importance. The new law introduces a medium-term budgetary framework for the general government to be approved by the Parliament. This framework includes detailed fiscal targets, a clear reference of the macroeconomic assumptions on which fiscal forecasts are based, sensitivity analysis of fiscal targets, identifications of main upside risks, etc. A top-down approach is introduced for public expenditure involving expenditure ceilings for all levels of general government. The General Accounting office is required to submit to Parliament and make public detailed reports for budget execution on a monthly, quarterly and biannual basis, while internal audit procedures are strengthened. Important amendments to the approved budget (e.g. if public borrowing requirements exceed the budget forecast by more than 10%) have to be approved by the Parliament, after the minister of Finance has submitted a supplementary Budget.
The scope of the proposed reforms to the Greek budgeting framework is indeed ambitious and the extent to which they will transform the quality of fiscal governance remains to be seen 14 In 2007, for example, there were 6,650 budget adjustment decisions, which regarded reallocations of expenditures (oecd, 2010). in practice. It seems however that the implementation of these reforms in practice has been so far slow. In any case, as international experience shows, any reforms in fiscal governance are foremost political processes, and not just technical ones, have to be based on realistic timescales, and need country ownership and political commitment.
Tax Reform and Tax Administration
The large revenue shortfalls identified in section II can at least partly be attributed to the poor performance of tax administration mechanisms in Greece and the related problem of widespread tax evasion. 15 most Greek governments have acknowledged this issue and announced their firm intention to address it through comprehensive tax reforms. The experience of the recent past, however, has shown that attempts were limited mainly to small changes in the tax rates, without addressing the structural weakness of the tax administration system.
The importance of tax administration in the proper functioning of any tax system has long been recognized. The main mandate of tax administration mechanisms is the enforcement of tax laws, which are indeed extensive in their range and nature, involve many persons and businesses and result in the collection of a vast bulk of revenues needed to support the state (crandall, 2010) . In this respect, the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and impartiality of revenue collection mechanisms are key ingredients of a good tax system. In Bird's (2004 and 2008) terms, effectiveness requires establishing an environment in which citizens are induced to comply with tax laws voluntarily, while efficiency requires that this task be performed at minimum cost to the community.
Based on international experience and the particular features of the Greek economy (e.g. a large number of very small enterprises and self-employed), an approach aimed at improving tax administration in Greece could indicatively (though not exhaustively) include the following: 16 • Reorganizing and consolidating tax administration offices and appointing members of staff on the basis of meritocracy and not party affiliation criteria.
• simplifying and rationalizing the entire tax system, which at present is excessively complex and highly inefficient (kaplanoglou and Rapanos, forthcoming).
• Avoiding frequent changes in the tax system.
• Radically changing the tax audit system, aligning it with the oecd principles. Tax audits should be organized on the basis of centralized controls that identify individuals or enterprises with high risk of evasion.
• stopping resort to "tax amnesties" that have been proved common in Greece whenever revenue receipts fell short of targets.
• creating an effective dispute resolution mechanism, so that resort to tax courts becomes the last solution.
• Improving the efficiency of the judicial system. currently revenues worth millions of euros are blocked in courts for several years until decisions are made.
The recent fiscal crisis spurred renewed interest in the aim of containing tax evasion, as an effective way of raising tax revenue and spreading the costs of fiscal adjustment fairly. The
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For a recent attempt to estimate its extent, see mylonas et al. (2010) .
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For a more details see oecd (2011) and Rapanos and kaplanoglou (2011 and forthcoming). same target is highly prioritized by the european commission, the ecB and the ImF in the framework of the financial assistance program given to Greece in 2010 (ImF 2010). The reforms suggested by these institutions are along the principles outlined above. It is true that since then, some progress has been made, for example lifting bank secrecy for tax evaders, introducing imprisonment as a penalty with tax dues over 75,000 euros. Improving tax administration is rather a long-term game of building up adequate domestic institutional capacity, while the chances of success rest with a number of factors, such as a clear recognition at high political levels of the importance of this task. However, improving formal institutions, like enhancing the efficiency of tax administration, seems to be a necessary but not sufficient step. on a different footing, a recent and growing strand of literature (e.g. Feld and Frey 2002, sandmo 2005 ) takes a broader perspective on the determinants of tax evasion, away from the rational choice model of Allingham and sandmo (1972) . This literature tries to draw a connection between informal institutions (social norms, trust to the national institutions, perceived corruption, etc.) and voluntary tax compliance arising from high tax morale. more precisely, it is argued that in the real world citizens of democratic political jurisdictions perceive a connection between the taxes they pay and the government services provided to them. In this context, citizens could "voluntarily" pay their taxes if they trust their government to deliver the services it has promised. moreover, even if a citizen trusts her government, her behaviour will still be influenced by how she perceives other taxpayers to behave. In other words tax evasion should be treated not only as a pure economic but also a social phenomenon (sandmo 2005) . In this sense, voluntary compliance could be a good complement, or according to some authors (kirchler 2007) a good substitute for enforced compliance, with the proposals on improving tax administration mentioned above addressing only the latter.
one should therefore expect to find interesting relations between tax evasion and variables reflecting social norms and perceptions, as for example, the level of trust to the government, perceived corruption of national institutions, fair treatment by the tax authorities, etc. Table  5 combines data from different sources, namely a proxy for tax evasion ("hours worked undeclared"), and three proxies of informal institutions, i.e. perceived impartiality of tax authorities, level of trust to the government and perceived corruption. The sample consists of 17 european countries, including Greece. All coefficients are high, statistically significant and of the expected sign. Tax evasion is strongly negatively correlated with the level of trust and the perceived fairness of the tax system, and positively correlated with perceived corruption. Among the countries under consideration, Greece ranks first in the tax evasion proxy, has the lowest percentage of people believing that tax authorities are act impartially, records the second lowest percentage of people trusting their government and the second highest percentage of people thinking that corruption is widespread. Although it is clear that no causal relationships can be inferred from Table 5 , it appears that there is huge scope for improvement in how Greeks view public institutions, in forging trust, in enhancing the functioning of informal institutions and eventually in increasing levels of voluntary compliance with the tax system. In this respect improving the performance of the tax system requires a long-term, multi-faced approach, further analysis of which is perhaps beyond the scope of the present paper. For a more thorough discussion of these issues in the Greek case, see kaplanoglou and Rapanos (forthcoming). 
The Potential Role of an Independent Fiscal Council
Another element of a domestic fiscal framework that could be conducive to fiscal discipline is the establishment of non-partisan public bodies acting in the field of budgetary policy. most independent such bodies in operation today perform at least three core functions. First, they produce independent economic forecasts, on which forecasts on fiscal aggregates are based. second, they analyze and assess the forecasts on public revenue and expenditure, and highlight possible risks of deviation from the targets set by the government itself in the budget. Third, they monitor the budget implementation process throughout the year, and provide relevant information and statistical data at regular intervals (calmfors 2010 and 2011, chote et al. 2010, debrun et al. 2009 ).
The precise scope and type of activities vary among countries, depending on each country's institutional framework, historical evolution, challenges to be met and, not least, on the resources and personnel devoted to the council. The experience of countries where such councils act effectively shows that establishing and maintaining an independent research unit that provides objective budgetary information and exerts peer pressure in the formation of fiscal policies is an important challenge. It seems that certain fundamental characteristics must be present in order for the council to be successful, most importantly its independence from the government and its nonpartisan character. 17 such independence and effective functioning can be ensured 17 For details see Anderson (2009 ), calmfors and Wren-lewis (2011 ), and kopits (2011 . especially for Greece see Rapanos and kaplanoglou (2010) .
by strong professional leadership, the recruitment of high quality staff, appropriate sources of financing, the duration of its members' mandate, and the transparency of all its reports.
In Greece, in July 2010, the government submitted to Parliament a draft Bill, which established of a Parliamentary Budget office under the aegis of the Parliament. According to the law, the Parliamentary Budget office was not an independent fiscal council, but a simple division of the secretariat of the Parliament. Its mandate was rather vague and its main task was to "collect information on the state Budget, classify it in a systematic way, and provide general support to the Parliament work". In spring 2011, the President of the Parliament, after a bipartisan agreement, appointed four members of the PBo. The office started producing monthly information bulletins that were submitted to the special standing committee responsible for examining the Financial statement and the General Balance sheet of the state. However after the monthly bulletin of August, which argued in a rather not fully substantiated manner that the public debt was unsustainable, leaked to the press, there was heated public discourse, the members of the PBo resigned and since then the office is inactive. Given the critical situation of public finances in Greece, we still believe that the establishment of a truly independent fiscal council could contribute substantially to enhancing transparency and fostering credibility of fiscal policy in Greece.
V. conclUsIons
As a result of the recent crisis a broad consensus has emerged that the domestic institutional settings of a country are of primary importance for the conduct of sound fiscal policies, since such settings create the environment, the incentives and the constraints under which fiscal policy decisions are taken. Thus, recent discussion on fiscal governance has focused on precisely how domestic fiscal frameworks can be institutionally strengthened, while recent policy initiatives at the eU level aim precisely at specifying minimum requirements for such frameworks (european commission, 2012) . Greece is a prime example of how poor fiscal governance, if combined with other negative factors such as the instability of global financial markets, can indeed lead an economy to the brink of financial collapse and at the same time create a systemic problem for a common-currency area as a whole. In the case of Greece, as well as of quite a few other european countries, primary public deficits and a high level of public debt are likely to persist for a long period of time. so is the skepticism of world financial markets and, thus, the threat of further destabilization. In such an environment, the adoption of fiscal consolidation packages that will reduce the size of the public deficit is simply inadequate, unless institutional mechanisms that will enhance commitment to credible, sustainable and growth-enhancing long-run fiscal plans are also put in place.
As our research has shown for Greece, the accumulation of public deficits appears to have been a choice of governments and the result of failures of fiscal institutions, rather than the unfortunate result of macroeconomic conditions turning out less favorably than expected. At the same time, there were no mechanisms in place, either internal or external, that would effectively pinpoint the systematic deviations of public revenues and expenditures from the targets set, and act on their containment. In this respect, the fundamental reason underlying poor fiscal performance in Greece has been weak fiscal institutions and inadequate public financial management. Thus, unless serious effort is directed towards increasing the effectiveness of such institutions and in strengthening public financial management at all levels of government, Greece runs the danger of seeing the fruits of the very painful fiscal effort undertaken being wasted provided that the severity of the present situation will be hopefully overcome in a few years' time.
The need for improving fiscal governance in Greece seems to have been realized by Greek authorities and to have been highly prioritized by the international organizations surveilling the Greek economy. The first steps have been done, but a lot more is still under question and remains to be seen in practice. However, the successful implementation of such institutional reforms requires high-level political commitment and public support. From a political economy perspective, Greece's record on both has been particularly low in the past. Under the present situation political commitment is at least in the medium term strengthened by the commitments the government has undertaken vis-à-vis the three international organizations, but is an open bet after these organizations will stop their surveillance. Regarding public support, in our view, it can be built up only if the public is convinced that the burden of fiscal adjustment is spread fairly and that this adjustment will not seriously hamper the growth prospects of the economy and destroy social cohesion.
